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ANTITRUST-ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT NOT LIMITED TO CASES
IN WHICH PRICES UNDERCUT THOSE OF COMPETITOR; SU-
PREME COURT INTERPRETS STATUTORY TEST AS PROTECTING
COMPETITORS AS WELL AS COMPETITION. Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co. (U.S. 1967).
In 1957, faced with declining volume and substantial loss in the
fresh pie trade, Utah Pie Company-a family business which had
been in existence for thirty years-entered the frozen pie market in
the Salt Lake area. Using its existing facilities, Utah began to manu-
facture frozen pies for Safeway under Safeway's label, "Belair." In
addition, its pies were sold under the labels "Utah," "Frost 'N'
Flame," "Mayfresh," and "Sonny Boy." By 1961, the company was
selling frozen pies in Utah, Idaho, Washington, Colorado, and
Wyoming. Throughout this period, Utah's competitive emphasis was
on price, and, with few exceptions, its pies were sold at lower prices
than those of competitors. As a result, Utah's sales volume and
dollar sales substantially increased.
In order to counter Utah's competitive force, three other firms
initiated price reduction policies. Pet Milk Company, selling and
distributing pies throughout the United States, began to differentiate
prices in the Salt Lake area in December, 1959. In nine of the forty-
four months in question, Pet's prices were lower in Salt Lake than
in its other market areas. Yet at no time were Pet's prices lower
than Utah's. In addition, Continental Baking Company, marketing
its frozen pies under the "Morton" label, twice made two-week offers
of price concessions in order to increase its share of the Salt Lake
market. These concessions rendered Continental's prices lower in the
Salt Lake area than elsewhere; moreover, such prices were lower than
the cost of manufacture. In response to Continental's price reduc-
tions, Utah cut its prices. Lastly, Carnation sold its pies for a period
of eight months at a lower price in the Salt Lake area than in its
Los Angeles market. Carnation's pricing policy brought its price
level below cost throughout 1961.
Utah Pie Company brought suit for treble damages and injunction
against Continental, Carnation and Pet, charging that the defendants
had entered into a conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce and to
monopolize commerce in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act.1 Allegedly, this injury to commerce was to be effected by:
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
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(1) selling frozen pies at below cost in the Salt Lake City area; and
(2) selling pies at lower prices in that area than in markets in other
Western States-these being price discriminations in violation of
Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act.2 The result of these methods would be the weakening of Utah's
capital structure and destruction of its profits. At trial, the jury found
for the defendants on the Sherman Act conspiracy charge and for
the plaintiff on the Clayton Act price discrimination charge. Con-
tinental had also counterclaimed, charging Utah with a section 2 (a)
violation. The jury found for Continental on the counterclaim, but
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was entered for Utah.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, address-
ing itself only to the section 2 (a) question, reversed, holding that
there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable in-
jury to competition under section 2(a).3 On certiorari to the Su-
preme Court,4 held, reversed: There was evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the defendants' activities resulted in a probable
injury to competition. In light of a statutory test, which tends to look
to the probable consequences of price discrimination, such injury
to competition is reasonably possible even where, after a course of
price-cutting, sales volume continues to expand, and some or all
competitors continue to operate at a profit. Consequently, the Robin-
son-Patman provisions are not limited to cases in which prices con-
sistently undercut those of a competitor; there can be a violation of
the Act even where the prices of the injured competitor are con-
sistently lower than those of the defendant. Utah Pie Co. v. Con-
tinental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
In reversing the findings of the court below, the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that to establish a violation of section 2 (a)
there must be evidence sufficient to show that the lower price either
substantially lessened competition, tended to create a monopoly, or
injured competition or that such injury in the future is a reasonable
2 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). The relevant portion of the Code states:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either
or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce...
*here the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
3 Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 349 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1965).
4 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 382 U.S. 914 (1965).
[VOL. 5
1968] RECENT CASES
possibility. The court stated that there are two elements of a violation
of section 2 (a): price discrimination, and either a substantial lessen-
ing of competition or the reasonable possibility thereof. Thus, the
fact that a seller lowers his price in one market area without lower-
ing his price in other markets is not, alone, a violation of section 2 (a).
Applying these principles to the facts in Utah, the court found that
there was no lessening of competition due to the defendants' pricing
policies, and that such result was unlikely in the future, since through-
out the four-year period, Utah had remained prosperous and had
retained a substantial share of the market.5 To hold that Utah was
entitled to retain its 66.5 percent share of the market would be
tantamount to giving carte blanche to a near-monopoly, a result
which was not intended by Congress in enacting the Robinson-Pat-
man Act.
The Robinson-Patman Act of June 19, 1936, which amends Section
2 of the Clayton Act, was designed to protect small businesses against
competing operations of large interstate concerns. Its primary objec-
tive was to afford protection to small buyers who were in competition
with large "chain" buyers. Subsection (a) forbids price discrimina-
tion which results or may result in injury to competition. The Act
contains, however, provisos making the proscription of price differ-
entials less than absolute.
r 386 U.S. 685 n.7. The volumes and market shares of competitors in the Salt
Lake market from 1958 to 1961 were:
1958
























SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[
Though the purpose of the Act was allegedly protection of compe-
tition, Congressman Celler attacked it, asserting that the Act de-
prives consumers of the benefits of free competition." Professors
Rowe7 and Blackford8 have also questioned the advisability of ap-
plying the price discrimination provision of the Act in such a manner
that the public interest in the competitive process would be con-
sidered secondary to the protection of competitors.
In 1954, the FTC twice entertained the question of protection of
competitors. In Purex Corp.," Purex had discriminated in price in the
form of special discounts in selected market areas. The discounts had
been offered to all customers in the area without discrimination. The
ruling here indicated that in enacting Robinson-Patman, Congress
was concerned with large buyers forcing manufacturers to give
favored price treatment, rather than with territorial price differences
initiated by manufacturers for their own purposes.'0 In General
Foods Corp.," the manufacturer had offered special discounts in
selected geographical areas. The ruling included a statement that
the concern in primary line cases12 is not whether a seller has lost
business, but whether competition in an area has been, or is likely
to be, substantially injured.' 3 However, in Moore v. Mead's Fine
Bread Co.,' 4 where an interstate competitor had maintained prices in
interstate competition while engaging in a price war with a purely
6 Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective,
57 CoLum. L. REv. 1059, 1071 (1957).
'7 F. RowE, PiucE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 130
(1962). Rowe stated that:
A focus on detrimental effects on competition, rather than a concern with
individual competitors, is fundamental to a reconciliation of the Robinson-
Patman Act with over-all antitrust policies.
8 Blackford, A Survey of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 285, 303 (1966). It was Blackford's contention that, under the Act,
"prices should be determined by the demands of the market rather than by business-
men's fear of violating" its proscriptions.
9 51 F.T.C. 100 (1954).
10 Id. at 111.
11 50 F.T.C. 885 (1954).
12 A primary line injury occurs where a seller discriminates in prices charged his
buyers; thus, competition among sellers is endangered, since other sellers must respond
to the price cuts or be faced with loss of buyers' business. Injury in the secondary line
involves the seller's price cuts to some buyers but not to others. In this situation, a
buyer receiving pricing benefits would be enabled to present more attractive pricing to
his customers to the detriment of buyers who had not benefited from the price cuts.
There is injury to competition in the tertiary line where a buyer differentiates in
pridng between his customers, so that some customers are enabled to purchase from
the buyer at costs below those charged other customers of the same buyer. See Rowe,
supra note 6.
Is 50 F.T.C. at 887.
14 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
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local competitor, the Supreme Court found that the local competitor
was protected against discriminatory price-cutting by the interstate
competitor which had used its advantage of size to enable it to cut
local prices.
Later, in the decision in Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells,15 the court
for the Tenth Circuit observed that it was "not within the scope or
purpose of the antitrust laws to protect a business against loss in a
competitive market . . . ";11 rather, in cases of price-cutting, the
intent of the firm making the cuts was of primary importance. In
Ben Hur, companies had been competing in the same town. It was
found that, although Ben Hur had cut prices, the cuts had not been
motivated by malice, and that there had been no predatory intent.
There has been a series of decisions which seemingly indicate that,
in price discrimination questions, the court will consider the entire
competitive atmosphere. Indeed, the court for the Tenth Circuit, in
Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co.,17
a leading case in this series, has explicitly indicated such an intention.
There, Diamond Block had been selling cinder concrete building
blocks at prices lower in the market in question than elsewhere. The
court held that a jury could consider the size of the firm and its
economic power in the area in determining the tendency of price
discriminations to injure competition.18 In FTC v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc.,19 decided in 1960, the Supreme Court recognized that geographic
price differences are price discriminations and again stated that the
Robinson-Patman Act does not flatly prohibit price differentials, since
price differences are only one element of a section 2(a) violation.
Anheuser-Busch had lowered prices in the St. Louis area without
making similar reductions in other areas. The Court found that there
had been no overtones of "business buccaneering" on the part of
Anheuser-Busch and that, while geographic price discriminations are
subject to the criteria of section 2, there is no absolute prohibition of
differentials.2 0
Yet, prior to 1964, there remained the question of whether, in
primary line cases, price differentials constitute price discrimination.
15 242 F.2d 481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957).
16 Id. at 486.
17 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
18 Id. at 956.
19 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
20 Id. at 553.
1968]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
In FTC v. Morton Salt,21 the secondary line was involved. Morton
Salt had discriminated in prices between different purchasers of like
grade and quality of salt. Only five companies had bought sufficient
quantities of salt to qualify for the discount. The Court held that an
injury to a competitor was evinced where there was a price differential
sufficient in amount to influence competitors' resale price.22 Thus,
a showing of injury to a competitor would justify a finding of injury
to competition. In 1964, the Seventh Circuit, in Borden Co. v. FTC,"8
held the Morton Salt rule inapplicable in cases of area price discrimi-
nation where there is a requirement of primary line injury. By refusing
to apply the Morton Salt rule to Borden, a primary line case, it is
evident that the court deemed that in primary line cases, a finding of
injury to competition would not necessarily be justified by a showing
of injury to the competitor resulting from price differentials. Borden
had sold milk in Ohio for a period of one week at prices which varied
from community to community. The court distinguished primary and
secondary line competition, holding that the finding in Morton must
be limited to cases involving injury to competition between purchasers
of the discriminating supplier.24 The court further held that there
must be substantial competitive injury, and that a judicial distinction
must be drawn between injury to competitors and injury to com-
petition.
However, courts continued to be plagued by the unanswered
question of whether injury to competitors is injury to competition.
It was this question which was approached in the Utah case and
which the Court has somewhat clarified. In remanding the case to the
court of appeals pursuant to the case made against the defendants,
the Court indicated that any price differentials, which bring about a
general decline in prices over a considerable period of time, may have
a lasting impact upon competitors. Such impact may tend to make a
competitor less effective as such, and may eventually injure competi-
tion through erosion. It is evident that the Court will, in the future,
find prospective injury to competition whenever it is possible to find
a protracted course of price-cutting in which prices are reduced below
cost, or in which there is price differentiation upon a geographic
basis without regard to primary versus secondary areas of com-
petition.
21 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
22 Id. at 49-50.
28 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964).
24 Id. at 957.
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The Court in Utah Pie considered the charges against each of the
defendants separately. In ruling against Pet, it held that there was
evidence from which a jury could find price discrimination over a
period of nearly two years. The burden of proving cost justification25
in the sales to Safeway was on Pet, and Pet had presented statistics
which related only to 24 percent of the Safeway sales. This was in-
sufficient to take the question from the jury. In addition, a jury could
have found predatory intent from Pet's use of an industrial spy and
from the management's statements that Utah was an unfavorable
factor in Pet's economic picture. Thus, the evidence as a whole estab-
lished a reasonable possibility of injury to competition.
Continental had employed below-cost pricing to increase its share
of the market. Utah had met Continental's reductions and had con-
tinued to increase its sales volume. The Court adjudged that the
jury was entitled to consider the impact of Continental's reductions
as if Utah had not met them with corresponding price cuts. Conse-
quently, the jury might have concluded that Continental's pricing, if
continued for a period of time, would have resulted in Continental's
receiving Safeway's trade and the patronage of other buyers. Conti-
nental itself would, however, have begun to feel the effects of below-
cost pricing, and the continued reductions would have rendered it a
less effective competitor. In addition, such pricing policies and Utah's
response would have had an adverse impact upon others in competi-
tion with Continental and Utah. Since a jury could have determined
both actual and possible injury to competitors, it would be possible
to find a violation of section 2 (a).
There were elements in the case against Carnation which were
similar to those in the other two cases. Like Pet, Carnation had
engaged in geographic price differentials; like Continental, Carna-
tion had made below-cost sales. Again, it was held that, as with the
other defendants and for the same reasons, a jury could find possible
injury to competition.
The Court has read the Robinson-Patman Act to forbid conditions
which will injure competitors, even where such conditions are created
in an attempt to injure a competitor who enjoys a near-monopolistic
25 Defenses to a charge of violation of section 2(a) include cost justification and
good faith meeting of competition. These defenses are asserted after the prima facie
case has been made. Since the issue before the Court was the sufficiency of evidence to
support a finding of possible injury to competition, the question of defenses was not
considered. See Blackford, supra note 8.
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situation.26 However, it must be borne in mind that Utah Pie dealt
only with the prima fade showing of price discrimination, and that
the Court noted that the discrimination is only one element of a
section 2(a) violation.
The decision in Utah Pie is consistent with decisions in other price
discrimination cases. Utah Pie simply clarifies the relationship be-
tween injury to competition and injury to competitors under Robin-
son-Patman. However, in situations such as that of Utah Pie, the
lowering of prices by sellers results in lower prices to consumers,
and a consequent benefit to the consumer. In the debate on the bill
that later become the Robinson-Patman Act, Congressman Celler
stated that "the consumers owe no business a living; laws like the
instant one intended to preserve any business at the expense of the
consumer will in the end prove harmful. '2 7 Twenty years later, Pro-
fessor Galbraith wrote of the Act: "Even those who are unwavering
in their belief in competition have been inclined to doubt whether
this legislation does much to protect competition.
' 28
Robinson-Patman was not designed to benefit the consumer. Its
primary object was the protection of smaller firms from larger sup-
pliers and larger customers. It is questionable whether the Act was
originally intended to protect competitors in the primary line. Yet
Utah Pie indicates that the Court will find injury to competition
where there is a possible injury to competitors in the primary line.29
If it is desirable to protect the public interest by means of legislation
that will preclude the sheltering of individual competitors in a vigor-
ously competitive market, it will be necessary to seek new legislation
and possibly to repeal Robinson-Patman.
MARY L. ScoTT
26 386 U.S. at 704. Mr. Justice Stewart, in a dissent in which Mvr. Justice Harlan
joined, argued that the actual effect of the price cuts upon competition was beneficial.
He contended that it is error to read Robinson-Patman as protecting competitors rather
than competition. For discussion of the point raised by the dissent and also for graphic
representation of pricing in the Salt Lake market, see Bowman, Restraint of Trade by
the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967).
27 Rowe, supra note 6, at 1071, 1072.
28 J. K. GALBRArrH, AMERICAN CAPrrALISM 144 (1956).
29 See National Dairy Products Corp., TRADE REG. REP. II 17,656, if 17,704 (FTC
1967). The FTC found a violation of section 2(a) under circumstances somewhat like
those of Utah Pie. National Dairy had offered discounts on purchases of jellies and
preserves to retailers in selected market areas. The Commission ruled that National
Dairy's offer was a price discrimination which resulted in possible injury to competi-
tion in the primary line.
